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Introduction°. 
 
     The crisis within the Euro area have become frequent during 2010. First was the Greek 
economy to face a default problem of its sovreign debt, in November it was Ireland who has been 
in a serious financial situation at the verge of collapse causing difficulties to the euro. So the 
Eurozone Governments and international institutions are continually trying to resolve these 
serious problems that create instability and jeopardize the very existence of European Monetary 
Union. Many of the countries of the European Monetary Union accumulated large deficit / GDP 
in 2009, also caused by the global crisis that has developed since 2008 by the United States 
around the world. This has inevitably burdened the public debt of countries such as Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal, Spain and even Italy, which have found it difficult to finance their debt and 
have created a problem of instability and cohesion of European Monetary Union as a whole. 
     But this is only one aspect of the crisis, the other one, related to the former, is the recession 
hitting the EMU economies, which are suffering of high unemployment, slowing down of 
production, difficulties in exporting, further crisis of the welfare state. 
     In this contribution we focus on the Greek crisis, we know that EMU Governments  and IMF  
agreed to provide Greece with enough financing to cover its refinancing needs for three years, 
while the Greek government commits to an additional tough austerity program. We also know 
that Germany is the country of the Euro area which has a large trade surplus with Greece and 
other Euro partners, hence strong trade imbalances occur within the Eurozone economy. 
     In the present work we suggest, through a model of coopetition based on game theory and 
conceived at a macro level, feasible solutions in a cooperative perspective for the divergent 
interests which drive the economic policies in Germany and Greece, with the aim of improving 
the position of Greece, Germany and the whole Euro area and also giving a contribution to 
expand the set of macroeconomic policy tools. 
      Germany is the country who has profited most from the Euro since the start of the European 
Monetary Union, according to Adam Posen (2010). Because the benefits received from the 
German economy has been possible thanks to a cooperative economic system, the main purpose 
of our paper is to explore win-win solutions for Greece and Germany, involving improvements 
in domestic demand in Germany. 
      We do not analyze the causes of the financial crisis in Greece and its relevant political and 
institutional effects on the European Monetary Union. Rather we focus on some crucial aspects 
of the Greek economy, with their implications on the Euro area. Specifically we concentrate on 
stability and growth, which should drive the economic policy of  Greece, Germany and the other 
Euro countries. 
     The work is organized as follows: the first section examines the Greek crisis and it also 
focuses on Germany, the major economy of the Euro area and the biggest exporter, suggesting a 
possible way out to reduce the intra-eurozone imbalances through coopetitive solutions within a 
growth path.  The second section provides a game theory analytical framework of coopetition 
with two original models of coopetitive games applied to the Eurozone context, showing their 
solutions. Conclusions end up the paper. 
 
___________________ 
° The Introduction and section 1. of this paper are written by D. Schilirò, section 2. is written by D. Carfì, 
Conclusions have been drawn by the two authors. 
We wish to thank Giambattista Dagnino, Davide Provenzano and Albert E. Steenge for their helpful comments and 
suggestions. 
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1. A New Tool for Macroeconomic Policy: Coopetitive Solutions for the 
Greek Crisis. 
 
     The deep financial crisis of Greece, which was almost causing the default of its sovereign 
debt, determining also financial instability in the European markets and the devaluation of the 
Euro, has revealed the weaknesses of Greek economy.  This crisis has also showed the 
contradictions that have been characterized the EMU and the Euro since their start1. 
Furthermore, EMU is featured by the presence of two countries, Germany and France, which 
have a major and increasing political and economic role. 
     Greece is a country with a total population of 11 million and it represents 2,6% of the 
Eurozone’s GDP. This country adopted the euro in 2001, then interest rates fell to near German 
levels, the lowest in the Euro area, fueling consumer spending and house prices. Since joining 
EMU, Greece has lost competitiveness and, because of that, Greek’s unit labor cost rose 34 
percent from 2000 to 2009. Thus, Greece relied on state spending to drive growth. With the 
outbreak of the crisis, debt in Greece has surged as in the other countries, but in 2009 Greece 
recorded a deficit/GDP ratio of 13.6%, one of the highest of the Eurozone economies. This has 
created deep concerns about its fiscal sustainability.  
Greece has also accumulated a huge debt of about 310 billion euros, thus its financial esposition 
prevents the Greeek government to find capital in the financial markets. The country, therefore, 
has become at risk of sovereign default. In the meantime the other EMU countries, after a period 
of uncertainty which raises the cost of the bailout, have decided to help Greece financially also 
with the support of IMF2. This financial contribution is likely to be given until 2012 and it will 
be very substancial3.  But tough austerity conditions are requested in return for the emergency 
loans, which are to be paid with interest rates below the market rates, the Greek Government is 
required to take courageous and specific actions that will lastingly and credibly consolidate the 
public budget4. The EMU-IMF package also includes measures to enhance competition in many 
sectors which are still protected; thus the country is expected to reduce its budget deficit from 
13.6 per cent of gross domestic product to below 3 per cent by 2014. 
However, although a restrictive fiscal policy and budget austerity are necessarily implemented 
by the Greek Government, they could be insufficient for Greece to overcome its crisis. The 
austerity measures are likely to hit hard the Greek economy, since its growth is expected to be 
negative this year and the next year, making the financial recovery even more problematic5. 
Furthermore, exports are much less than imports, so the trade balance shows a deficit around 
10%. Therefore, the focus of economic policy of Greece should become its productive system 
and growth must be the major goal for the Greek economy. This surely would help its re-
equilibrium process.   
                                                 
1 One feature of the institutional setting of the European Monetary Union is the Stability and Growth Pact that guards against the 
emergence of public deficits and debt, but actually there isn’t a true and effective mechanism of enforcement in the Pact. 
Therefore the budget policy in each country of the Eurozone is not under control. Yet the European Commission has, just after 
the Greek crisis, proposed tougher rules to enforce fiscal discipline in the Eurozone and to set up a permanent crisis management 
mechanism to prevent sovereign debt disasters. 
2 An agreement has been  reached on May 2nd, between the Eurogroup, the IMF and the Greek Government. 
3 The total sum given to Greece in three years should be of 110 billion euros. 
4 First, to recover from the budget disequilibrium, Greece is expected to improve the primary balance of 10 percent of GDP over 
the next three years (This is an  heavy task, but other economies like Lettonia and Hungary have succeded  in the recent past  
with the help and the assistance of the IMF and EU). Moreover, the package includes measures to reduce the size of Greece’s 
public sector, cuts in public sector salaries and pensions, a rise in value added tax and other tax increases. 
5 This view, of course, is not shared by the economists who believe that fiscal adjustments not always cause recessions (Giavazzi, 
Pagano, 1990; Von Hagen, Strauch, 2001; Alesina, Adagna, 2009). 
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     On the other hand, Germany is considerd the soundest European economy.  First of all, it 
accounts for about one-third of the Eurozone economy. Secondly, it is the world’s second-
biggest exporter, but its wide commercial surplus is originated mainly by the exports in the Euro 
area, that accounts for about two thirds. Furthermore, since 2000 its export share has gradually 
increased vis-à-vis industrial countries. Thirdly, its government has not allowed itself the 
extraordinary budget deficits that are threatening economies like Ireland, Italy, Greece, Portugal 
and Spain. Despite these positive records, the contribution of domestic demand to real GDP from 
1999 onwards in Germany has been weak. It is clear, from such a context, that the Germany’s 
growth path has been driven by exports. We do not discuss in this work the factors explaining 
Germany’s increase in export share, but we observe that its international competitiveness has 
been improving, with the unit labor cost which has been kept fairly constant, since wages have 
essentially kept pace with productivity. Therefore the prices of the German products have been 
relatively cheap, favouring the export of German goods towards the Euro countries and towards 
the markets around the world, especially those of the emerging economies (China, India, Brasil, 
Russia). Finally, just during 2010 Germany has recovered very well from the 2008-2009 global 
crisis and is growing at a higher rate than the others Euro partners. 
      Thus, we share the view that Germany (and the other surplus countries of the Euro area, i.e. 
Netherlands) should contribute to overcome the crisis of the EMU economies and of Greece in 
particular stimulating its domestic demand and relying less on exports towards the Euro area. 
Germany, as Adam Posen (2010) underlined6, has benefited from being the anchor economy for 
the Eurozone over the last 11 years. In fact, it enjoyed a wider and deep range of trade in the 
Euro currency than it had under the Deutch Mark. For instance, in 2009, during a time of global 
contraction, Germany has been a beneficiary, being able to run a sustained trade surplus with its 
European neighbours. Germany exported, in particular, 6.7 billions euros worth of goods to 
Greece, but imported only 1.8 billion euros worth in return.  
Clearly a policy which aims at growth in Greece, Germany and  the whole Euro area is very 
important, specially if we take a medium-long term perspective and if we consider that the rate 
of unemployment in the Euro area has reached 10.1%7, the highest rate in almost 12 years8 . 
      We believe that a policy that aims at adjusting budget and trade imbalances and looks at 
improving the growth path of the real economy in the medium and long term in Greece is the 
only possible one to assure a stable re-balancing of the Greek economy and to contribute to the 
stability of the Euro area. As we have already argued, German modest wage increases and weak 
domestic demand favoured the export of German goods towards the Euro countries. This is why 
Posen, as reported by Business Week on March 31, 2010, said that Germany should boost 
domestic demand and increase wages to ease the lopsided euro-region trade flows that restrict 
growth in economies like Greece and Portugal. Therefore he suggests a “win-win solution”9 for 
the EMU countries, which entails that Germany, which still represents the leading economy, 
should stimulate domestic demand, increase wages in its own country, so that to make its own 
people better off, and thereby ease some of the pressure on the southern countries of the Euro 
area. In Posen’s proposal there is a clear suggestion to Germany to re-balance its trade surplus. 
                                                 
6 See also Abadi (2010). 
7 Source: Eurostat. The figure refers to april 2010. 
8 Another aspect to highlight is that despite the new huge rescue plan of 750 billion euros supported by the EU and IMF to avoid 
the contagion of the Greeek crisis to the other EMU countries, the recent turmoil in the financial markets and the consequent 
weakening of the Euro seem to confirm the poorly optimistic expectations of the financial markets on the future of the Greek 
economy. Investors are looking for a credible plan that indicated public finances in Greece but also in whole Euro area could be 
kept at a sustainable level. In this context the view that a partial debt restructuring by the Greek government might become a 
sensible and realistic solution.  
9 A win-win solution is the outcome of a game which is designed in a way that all participants can profit from it in one way or the 
other. In conflict resolution a win-win strategy is a process that aims to accommodate all disputants. 
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Of course, we are aware that this is a mere hypothesis10. Although Germany has been pursuing a 
strategy of competitiveness based on investments in technology and R&D on the one hand, and 
on industrial relations, which are featured by cooperative behaviors between labor and capital, on 
the other since 2003. We believe that this cooperative attitude, which is an hallmark of German 
capitalism, can be also taken with respect to its Euro partners and the Greece in particular. Thus 
we pursue our hypothesis and suggest a game theory coopetitive model as an innovative 
instrument to analyze possibile solutions to obtain a win-win outcome for Greece and Germany, 
which would also help the whole EMU economy.  
     Giving that Greece must fulfil the conditions of the agreement signed with the Eurozone 
Governments and the IMF for their financial help and, for this reason, it must implement a fiscal 
policy of government budget consolidations, with current spending cuts and tax increases, to 
reduce its public and private debt, these changes in current variables (taxes, incentives, provision 
of public services) would probably also change the expectations about future fiscal policy11. In 
our view, Greece must keep its wages and salaries under control and, at the same time, focus on 
investments and exports as the two main strategic variables to improve the structure of 
production and to shift the aggregate demand towards a higher growth path. However, aiming at 
exports for a country like Greece that has a low “Extra Euro Area” export share on GDP (about 
4%) does not mean to rely on the external demand, for instance through the devaluation of the 
euro, rather to follow an appropriate medium term strategy. In this medium term strategy, Greece 
should focus on innovative investments, specially investments in knowledge12, to change and 
improve its production structure and to increase its production capacity and its productivity, 
which is made possible by the structural change process. As a result of that its competitiveness 
will raise. An economic policy that focuses on investments and exports, instead of consumptions, 
will address Greece towards a sustainable growth and, consequently, its financial reputation and 
stability will get improved.  
      The idea which is driving our model to face the Greek crisis is based on a notion of 
coopetition where the cooperative aspect will prevail. Thus we are not talking about a situation in 
which Germany and Greece are competing in the same European market for the same products, 
rather we are assuming a situation in which Germany stimulates its domestic demand and, in 
doing so, will create a larger market for products from abroad, but also we are envisaging the 
case in which Germany purchases a greater quantity of Greek products, in this case Greece 
increases its exports, selling more products in Germany. The final results will be that Greece will 
find in a better position, but also Germany will get an economic advantage determined by the 
higher growth in the two countries and, finally, because it will prevail a greater stability within 
the EMU system. 
      Therefore we provide, in the present work, a new set of tools based on the notion of 
coopetition, that could be fruitful for the setting of the Greek policy issues.  
      The concept of coopetition has been devised following different theoretical approaches. 
Essentially the literature on coopetitive games has a microeconomic origin and has an important 
point of reference in the seminal paper of Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1995), who studied the 
strategic behaviour of firms applying some basic notion of game theory and elaborated their 
theoretical original concept of coopetition within a competitive environment. Brandenburger and 
                                                 
10 After the Greek crisis, because of the turmoil in the financial markets, the German government have decided to take austerity 
fiscal measures, which consists of a seven years plan of government budget consolidations of 70 billion euros (10 billion euros 
for each year), based mainly on structural spending cuts to welfare payments and reduction in the public sector10. This plan, 
however, will also favour investment in education and research to improve Germany’s capacity to compete at a global level. T 
11 Regarding the indirect positive effect on aggregate demand see Hellwig, Neumann ( 1987) that merge the Keynesian view and 
the expectations view or “German view” on budget cutting. See also Giavazzi, Pagano (1990). 
12 Schilirò (2010b). 
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Nalebuff suggest the term coopetition (a situation  in which the firm must cooperate and compete 
at the same time) to indicate a situation in which the firm thinks about both cooperative and 
competitive ways to change the game (1995, p.59).13 Another approach to coopetition represents 
the synthesis between the competitive paradigm (Porter, 1985) and the cooperative paradigm 
(Gulati, Nohria, Zaheer, 2000), a sort of integrative framework between the two, like that offered 
by Padula and Dagnino (2007), who define coopetition as the intrusion of competitive elements 
into a cooperative environment, because of the partially divergent interests among the partners. 
Thus coopetition is a complex construct and it is the result of the interplay between competition 
and cooperation. 
      Our model of coopetition is closer to the approach that regards coopetition as a complex 
construct rooted in a cooperative environment. Thus we suggest a model of coopetitive games, 
applied at a macroeconomic level, which intends to offer possible solutions to the partially 
divergent interests of Germany and Greece in a perspective of a cooperative attitude that should 
drive their policies. Another important aim of the model is to enrich the set of tools of 
macroeconomic policy for the EMU crisis. 
 
2. An Analytical Framework of Coopetitive Games. 
 
     In this section we provide a general analytical framework of coopetition with two models of 
cooopetitive games, applying them to the two EMU countries, Germany and Greece. The two coopetitive 
models will show the possible solutions feasible in a particular coopetitive context, defined by the set of 
strategy profiles chosen by the two countries through a convenient ex ante agreement. This suggested 
analytical framework enables us to wide the set of possible solutions in a coopetitive context and it allows 
“to share the pie fairly” in a win-win scenario. At the same time, it permits to examine the range of 
possible economic outcomes along a coopetitive dynamic path. Finally, it limits the space within which 
the coopetitive solutions can be determined. 
 
2.1 The general analytical framework 
 
The basic definition we propose of coopetitive game is the following one. 
 
Definition (of coopetitive game). Let E, F and C be three nonempty sets. We define two person 
coopetitive gain game carried by the strategic triple (E,F,C) any pair of the form G = (f, >), 
where f is a function from the Cartesian product E × F × C into the real Euclidean plane and > is 
the usual order of the Cartesian plane, defined, for every couple of points p, q, by p > q iff pi > qi, 
for each index i. 
 
Remark. The difference among a two person normal-form gain game and a two person 
coopetitive game is simply the presence of the third strategy Cartesian-factor C. 
 
Terminology and notation. Let G = (f, >) be a two person coopetitive gain game carried by the 
strategic triple (E, F, C). We will use the following terminologies: 
 
- the function f is called the payoff function of the game G; 
 
- the first component f1 of the payoff function f is called the payoff function of the first player 
and analogously the second component f2 is called the payoff function of the second player; 
                                                 
13 Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1995) implicitly assume that the competitive environment is an oligopolistic market structure. 
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- the set E is said the strategy set of the first player, the set F the strategy set of the second 
player; 
 
- the set C the cooperative strategy set of the two players. 
 
- the Cartesian product E × F × C is called the coopetitive strategy space of the game G. 
 
Memento. The first component f1 of the payoff function f of a coopetitive game G is the function 
of the strategy space of the game G into the real line defined by f1(x,y,z) = pr1(f(x,y,z)), 
analogously we proceed for the second component f2. 
 
Interpretation. We have two players, each of them has a strategy set in which to choose his 
strategy; moreover, the two players can cooperatively choose a strategy z in a third set C. The 
two players will choose their cooperative strategy z to maximize (in some sense) the gain 
function f. 
 
Bargaining solutions of a coopetitive game. The payoff function of a two person coopetitive 
game is (as in the case of normal-form game) a vector valued function with values belonging to 
the Cartesian plane R2; so that we should consider the maximal Pareto boundary of the payoff 
space im(f) as an appropriate zone for the bargaining solutions. 
 
The family of normal form games associated with a coopetitive game. For any cooperative 
strategy z selected in the cooperative strategy space C there is a corresponding normal form 
game 
 Gz = (fz, >) 
upon the strategy pair (E,F) and with payoff function the section 
 f(. , z) : E × F → R2, 
of the payoff function f of the coopetitive game (the section is defined, as usual, on the 
competitive strategy space E × F by f(., z)(x) = f(x, z), for every bi-strategy x in the bi-strategy 
space E × F). 
 
General solution. The two players should choose the cooperative strategy z in order that, for 
instance 
 
- the Nash equilibria of Gz are “better” than the Nash equilibria in each other game Gz’; 
 
- the supremum of Gz is greater than the supremum of any other game Gz’; 
 
- the Pareto maximal boundary of Gz is “higher” than that of any other game Gz’; 
 
- the Nash bargaining solution is better in Gz than that in Gz’; 
 
- and so on, fixed a common kind of solution for any game Gz, say S(z) the set of these kind of 
solutions, we can consider the problem to find the optimal solutions in set valued path S, defined 
on the cooperative strategy set C; 
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we note the fundamental circumstance that in general the above criteria are multi-criteria and so 
they generate multi-criteria optimization problems. 
 
Let us formalize the concept of game-family associated with a coopetitive game. 
 
Definition (the family associated with a coopetitive game). Let G = (f, >) be a two person 
coopetitive gain game carried by the strategic triple (E, F, C). We naturally can associate with 
the game a family of competitive games G = (Gz)z∈C, which we will denote by the same symbol 
G and which we call the family of normal-form games associated with the coopetitive game G. 
 
Applicative remark. It is clear that with any family of normal form games G = (Gz)z∈C we can 
associate 
 
- a family of payoff spaces (im(fz))z∈C, 
 
- a family of Pareto maximal boundary (bd*Gz)z∈C; 
 
- a family of suprema (sup Gz)z∈C; 
 
and so on.  
 
And we can interpret any of the above families as set-valued paths in the strategy space E×F. 
 
It is just the study of these induced families which becomes of great interest in the study of a 
coopetitive game G. 
 
 
2.2 Two models of coopetitive games 
 
     In our analysis Germany is the first exporting country among the EMU countries, which has 
also experienced a weak domestic demand due to a modest wage increases. Thus our hypothesis 
is to stimulate Germany’s domestic demand and to re-balance its trade surplus in favour of 
Greece. 
     On the other hand, Greece is the country that showed a high and rising public debt, which 
determined its sovereign debt at risk of default. Given that Greece must pursue a budget austerity 
program externally imposed by the Euro area Governments and by IMF in exchange of their 
financial help, this country has anyway experienced a declining competitiveness of its products. 
Therefore our hypothesis is that Greece aims at growth by undertaking innovative investments 
and by increasing its exports primarily towards Germany and also towards the other Euro 
countries14. 
     The coopetitive models that we propose hereunder must be interpreted as normative models, 
in the sense that they will show the more appropriate solutions of a win-win strategy chosen 
within a cooperative perspective. 
 
The main variables of the two models are: 
                                                 
14 The potential benefit coming from a better  trade balance can also contribute to ease the government budget 
constraint and improve its public debt. 
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strategies x of Germany (the consumptions of Germany), which directly influence only Germany 
pay-off; 
 
strategies y of Greece (the investiments of Greece) which increase only Greece pay-off function;  
 
a shared strategy z which is determined ex ante together by the two countries, Germany and 
Greece (z is a given amount of Greek exports imported by Germany).  
 
Therefore, in the two models we assume that Germany and Greece define the set of coopetitive 
strategies. 
 
First coopetitive model. 
Main Strategic assumptions. We assume that a real number x, in the unit interval U = [0,1], is 
the consumption of Germany and a real number y, in the same unit interval U, is the investiment 
of Greece, moreover a real number z, again in U, is the amount of Greek exports which is 
imported by Germany. 
 
We also consider as payoff function of Germany its domestic demand, that we represent in our 
model as the algebraic sum of the variables x and z, and also of the exports of Germany as a 
reaction function with respect to its domestic consumption. 
 
 
Payoff function of Germany 
 
We assume that the payoff function of Germany is the function g of the square U × U into the 
real line, defined by   
 
g(x, z) = x + 1/(x + 1) – z, 
 
for every pair (x,z) in the square U × U; where the reaction function E, of U into the real line, 
defined by 
 
E(x) = 1/(x+1), 
 
for every consumption x of Germany in U, is the export of Germany corresponding to the level x 
of consumption; E is a decreasing function, randomly chosen, and within certain limits, this 
choice does not dimishes the generality of the model. 
 
 
Payoff function of Greece 
 
We  consider as payoff function of Greece the algebraic sum of the variables y and z. 
 
We assume that the payoff function of Greece is the function e of the quare U × U into the real 
line, defined by   
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 e(y,z) = y + z + my + nz = (1+m) y + (1+n)z 
 
for every pair (y,z) in the Cartesian square U × U; we note that the function e does not depend 
upon the strategy x chosen by Germany and that e is a linear function. The term my represents  
the quality and quantity effect of investments on the exports. In fact, the investments, specially 
innovative investments, contribute at improving the competitiveness of Greek goods, favouring 
the exports. The term nz is the cross-effect of  the coopetitive variable z that represents the 
additive level of investment required to support the production of z. We assume m and n strictly 
positive. 
 
 Payoff function of the game 
 
We so have build up a gain game with payoff function given by  
 
 p(x,y,z) = (x + 1/(x+1) - z, (1+m) y + z) = (x + 1/(x+1), (1+m) y) + z (-1,1+n) 
  
with x,y,z in [0,1]. 
 
Study of the game G = (p, >). 
 
Note that, fixed a cooperative strategy z in U, the game G(z) = (p(z), >) with payoff function 
p(z), defined on the square U× U by 
 
 p(z)(x,y) = p(x,y,z), 
is the translation of the game G(0) by the vector v(z) = z(-1,1+n), so that we can study the game 
G(0) and then we can translate the various informations of the game G(0) by the vector v(z). 
 
So let us consider the game G(0). Let the strategic square S be with vertices A,B,C,D, where A is 
the origin, B is the first canonical vector C the sum of the two canonical vectors and D be the 
second canonical vector. 
 
 Pareto Boundary in the payoff space 
 
The transformation of the side [A, B] is the trace of the curve 
 
 c(x) = p(x,0,0) = (x + 1/(x+1), 0), 
 
that is the segment 
 
 [A’, B’] = [(1,0), (3/2,0)]. 
 
The transformation of the segment [A, D] is the trace of the curve 
 
 c(y) = p(0,y,0) = (1, (1+m) y), 
 
that is the segment 
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 [A’, D’] = [(1,0), (1,1)]. 
 
The tranformation of the segment [B, C] is the trace of the curve 
 
 c(y) = p(1,y,0) = (1 + 1/2, (1+m) y), 
 
that is the segment [B’, C’] = [(3/2,0), (3/2,1+m)]. 
 
So that the payoff space of the game G(0) is the rectangle with vertices A’, B’, C’, D’.  
 
The payoff space of the coopetitive game G, the image of the payoff function p, is the union of 
the family of payoff spaces 
 
 (im p(z))z , 
 
that is the convex envelope of the of the four points A’, B’, C’, D’ and of their translations by the 
vector v(1). 
 
 The Pareto maximal boundary of the payoff space f(S) is the segment [P’, Q’], with P’ = 
C’ and Q’ = C’ + v(1).  
            It is important to note that the slope of the Pareto boundary is 1 + n. Thus the collective 
payoff g + e of the game is not constant on the Pareto boundary and, therefore, the game implies 
growth. 
  
 
              The Nash bargaining solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution, with 
respect to the infimum of the Pareto boundary, coincide with the medium point of the segment 
[P’, Q’]15. 
 
Transferable utility solution. In this coopetitive context it is more convenient to adopt a 
transferable utility solution: indeed the point of maximum collective gain is the point Q’ = (1, 3/2 
+ m + n)  
 
Thus we propose a new kind of coopetitive solution, as it follows (in the case m=0): 
 
First, we consider the coopetitive rectangle R having: a) two sides on the straight lines of 
equations Y=1 and Y = 3/2 + n; b) two vertices in (1,1) and (1,3/2 + n); c) the diagonal on the 
straight line S of equation Y + X = 2.5 + n. 
      Second, We consider the segment S’ of vertices (3/2,1) (supremum of the game G(0)) and the  
      supremum of  the rectangle R. 
      Third, our best payoff coopetitive compromise is the intersection of S and S’. 
 
                                                 
15 The classic Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, that we applied in both models, coincides with the solution on the 
coopetitive Nash path; this result allows us to provide a construct of coopetition wich is only “weakly”cooperative, 
in the sense that it not necessary to cooperate at every stage of the decision process. 
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This represents a win-win solution with respect to the initial supremum (3/2,1). 
 
 
Second coopetitive model 
 
Let us consider now that a fraction ax of Germany consumption comes from consumption of 
Greek goods, apart from the given amount of Greek exports that Germany has already 
determined through an ex ante agreement with Greece (z). 
 
Payoff function of Greece 
 
e(x,y,z) = by + z + ax 
  
Payoff function of the game 
  
p(x,y,z) = (x + 1/(x+1) - z, ax+by + cz) = (x + 1/(x+1), ax+ by) + z (-1,c) 
  
with a, x,y,z in [0,1] and b,c>1. 
  
     Similarly to the previous coopetitive model, but through a more complex procedure, we 
deduce that the Pareto boundary of the coopetitive game G = (p, >) – in the payoff space - is the 
above segment [P’, Q’] translated by the vector (0,a). 
 
     The Nash bargaining solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution, with respect 
to the infimum of the Pareto boundary, coincide with the medium point of the segment 
 [P’, Q’] + (0,a), 
which is the optimum of the game G1/2. 
 
 
 
Conclusions. 
 
     This contribution has tried to provide, through a game theory model of coopetition, feasible 
solutions in a cooperative perspective to the problems of Greek economy after its crisis. In 
particular, it has focused on stability and growth as the primary goals, which should drive Greece 
and Germany economic policy with their positive effects on the whole Euro area. 
    The idea underlying the present work was that of contributing to expand the set of 
macroeconomic policy tools available to face the economic crisis in Greece, and more generally 
in the European Monetary Union, where a cooperative attidude should prevail. 
    In this work have underlined two aspects which emerged from the crisis. First, the necessity of 
governement budget consolidation of Greece; second, the opportunity to re-balance the trade 
surplus of Germany with respect to Greece (and also with respect to the other Euro countries that 
have a deficit trade balance). 
      By means of two coopetitive models derived by an original general analytical framework of 
coopetition, we have showed the strategies that could bring to feasible solutions in a cooperative 
perspective for Germany and Greece, where these feasible solutions aim at offering a win-win 
outcome for both countries, letting them to share the pie fairly within a growth path represented 
by a non-zero sum game. In fact, our anlytical results allow us to find a “fair” amount of Greek 
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exports which Germany must import, in order to re-balance the trade surplus of Germany, as 
well as the investments necessary to improve the Greek economy, thus contributing to growth 
and to the stability of the Greek economy and, indirectly, of the whole European Monetary 
Union. 
      Finally, a remarkable analytical result of our work consists in the determination of the win-
win solution by a new selection method on the transferable utility Pareto boundary of the 
coopetitive game. 
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